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Finishing an article normally reminds me of pulling the plug in the
bathtub: everything goes away except for a faint unpleasant residue,
and no one is the wiser once I get things cleaned up for the next
article. It is always a shock to find out what other people think when
they actually do read something I've written. In fact, it is usually a
shock to find out that they read it at all, since my normal assumption
is that no one reads the thing once it is down the tubes, so to speak.
But these gracious commentators (prodded by writing assignments of
their own) have not only pondered my "gift" article; they have also
. told me what they think, some of them in no uncertain terms. The
following, of course, is what I think about what they think.
I. DID I SAY THAT?
Well, shoot, I guess I am a more bumbling writer than I had
thought I was. From reading Robert Frank's comment, l '! see that
he thinks that in the early stages of the article, I wanted to say that
there is no such thing as a simply generous and unself-interested gift;2
and in a particular instance, Mary Louise Fellows3 seemed to misun-
derstand my discussion of the potlatch,4 which I thought I was using
as an example of the limitations of some of the standard accounts -
and particularly the account of Self-Interest as the Motivator of All
Things. Thank goodness for Emily Hartigan5 and Jane Baron6 - they
1. Robert H. Frank, The Differences Between Gifts and Exchange: Comment on Carol
Rose, 44 FLA. L. REV. 319 (1992).
2. Id. at 326.
3. Mary L. Fellows, His to Give, His to Receive, Hers to Trust: A Response to Carol Rose,
44 FLA. L. REV. 329 (1992).
4. Id. at 345.
5. Emily F. Hartigan, Rose and Apple - Original Gifts?, 44 FLA. L. REV. 347 (1992).
6. Jane B. Baron, Do We Believe in Generosity?: Reflections on the Relationship Between
Gifts and Exchanges, 44 FLA. L. REV. 355 (1992).
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figured it out and give me some confidence back, though I now think
I must have been a bit too elliptical for my own good.
What I really wanted to get across was that a lot of scholarly
literature, and a lot of legal texts too, argue implicitly or explicitly
that self-interest always motivates even things that look like gifts.
But, like Bob Frank, I think that is a mistaken way to see things -
not only as a factual matter, but also, as Frank points out, as a social
matter as well,7 since all that greed-talk unnecessarily corrodes the
belief in generosity. Frank illustrates this wonderfully with his exam-
ples of the economics students, who apparently learn that they are
supposed to "defect."8 In fact, this is why I turned things upside down
in the later portions of the essay, to suggest that the pure self-interest
story is backwards, and that exchange itself depends on gift, rather
than the other way around.
On that issue too, though, Frank thinks that my position is ex-
treme, and that lots of exchange does not have anything to do with
gift and trust and all that blarney.9 He chiefly cites the well-known
book of Robert Axelrod, The Evolution ofCooperation, 10 which reports
on computer game contests in which the users of a basically cooperative
strategy, the so-called "tit-for-tat" strategy, outperformed a number
of other less cooperative strategies. (Since Frank describes tit-for-tat
in detail, I will not repeat it here, but refer the reader to his descrip-
tion).ll
What I want to say is, hey, Bob, come on, I've read Axelrod too
- I just don't think the book proves what you say it does. Can this
tit-for-tat strategy rely on self-interest tout court? Not so! Sure, tit-
for-tat cooperators in fact may do well over the long haul, but that
doesn't speak to the logic of cooperation, particularly to the logic of
making the first cooperative move. That first "nice" move only makes
sense if you think that you may be dealing with another cooperator.
As Jon Elster has pointed out, the first move has no strings attached,
and when you make it, in the hopes that the other guy will reciprocate
instead of taking the money and running, you are taking a leap of
7. See Frank, supra note 1, at 32l.
8. [d.
9. See id. at 326-27.
10. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
11. See Frank, supra note 1, at 323-24.
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faith. As Elster puts it, the move involves a kind of magical thinking
that the other guy will act the way you did. 12
One can tinker with this problem, as Frank does here, and add
the supposition that the players are already in some other kind of
network of interactions;13 but that gives away the whole game. Then
the players already know something about each other and have some
reasons to pay attention to each other; the critical first moves have
already been made. By the way, Axelrod's games were set up in
advance to involve repeat play,I4 which is in itself a kind of forced set
of interactions; but when two Hobbesians meet up at the OK Corral
in the old State of Nature, they don't know anything about each other
at all - certainly they don't know that they are going to have any
future moves together. In short, the ways that people actually behave
in repeat play, and even the fact that people might make gains if they
cooperate, doesn't tell us how or why they started those cooperative
repetitions.
So why do they trust each other and get going in the first place?
Well, Frank's examples suggest that it might be a matter of experience
and culture.15 Maybe people think other people just do act in a coopera-
tive way. We know people give tips in interstate highway restaurants,
when there seems to be nothing in it for the tipper; or, in Titmuss'
famous example, they make anonymous blood donations to total stran-
gers. 16 What I want to suggest is that freeway-tipping and blood
donations are a part of the standard behavioral repertoire that lots
of people have for themselves and that they expect from strangers,
at least some of the time. That is why Axelrod's tit-for-tat players
can have some initial optimism that their counterparts might be
cooperators too, rather than predators.
So, where does the behavioral repertoire come from? This is a
question to which Frank himself has paid a lot of attention, notably
in his very interesting book, Passions Within Reason. 17 Are some
12. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 188, 197-99
(1989). For some other problems in the logic of tit-far-tat, particularly the endgame difficulties
when interactions are finite, see ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A
STUDY OF THE PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEIII 65 n.17 (1989).
13. See Frank, supra note 1, at 324-25.
14. AxELROD, supra note 10, at 27-54.
15. See Frank, supra note 1, at 325-26.
16. RICHARD M. TITlIlUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SO-
CIAL POLICY (1971).
17. ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EIIlOTIONS (1988).
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measures of trust and generosity "hard-wired," a result of some
evolutionary pattern? Well, maybe; but as Frank points out in his
comment, there is a learning aspect to this behavior as well. 18 What
is more, cooperation can be unlearned, as with those little rotters,
the defecting economics students. 19 By the way, tit-for-tat itself in-
volves learning behavior too; the game makes no sense unless each
player learns that the other is (or can be) a cooperator. That is why
I think exchange behavior itself can be a learning experience, and
why successful exchanges can open up future realms of trust.
II. POWER PLAYS AND THE,SEDUCTIONS OF LARCENY
Ha! says Mary Louise Fellows in her intriguing if lugubrious com-
ment. She has a pretty jaded view of trust generally, particularly
when you see trust in "rich detail. "20 It turns out that the rich detail
is a group of appellate cases, dating in no particular order from five,
thirty, fifty, and one hundred years ago - along with lots of free
association about what the various parties' motives (and even their
color) might have been.21 Shoot, if I had the wits to figure out that
you can make up your own rich detail, I would have stuck in some
more rich detail myself.
Anyway, I'm less certain than Fellows about how to read these
cases. Take that 1892 grandaddy in Ricketts v. Scothom,22 whom Fel-
lows depicts as (perhaps) a selfish old miscreant,23 throwing around
his nonexistent financial power just to lure his granddaughter into
what he thought was respectable idleness.24 Well, that old coot looks
pretty pathetic to me, with all his false pride. But what do I know?
A good deal less than Fellows, I guess. For example, since this was
a case about a contested will,25 there were some other claimants to
grandaddy's estate, and I have no idea how comparatively sympathetic
those other claims might have been; but I don't think Fellows does
either. All the same, she has a point about the court's running commen-
tary,26 which does make out the grandad to be a sweet gentleman,
18. See Frank, supra note 1, at 325-26.
19. [d. at 321.
20. Fellows, supra note 3, at 329.
21. [d. at 332-34.
22. 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
23. Fellows, supra note 3, at 336.
24. [d.
25. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 365.
26. Fellows, supra note 3, at 335.
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and the granddaughter as something of a ditz (at one point her tears
were duly noted).27
What this is really about, Fellows tells us, is power imbalance.28
It is? To be sure, power makes a difference to who gets what in
transactions, at least some of the time - but not all the time, I would
warn, as in the cases where healthy people stop to give assistance to
helpless accident victims. In any event, from reading this case, I'm
not at all sure who has the power and why it matters. True enough,
Grandad was at least pretending to have money to give away so that
his "grandchildren" (male? female? both?) wouldn't have to work. 29
But does comparative wealth matter? Obviously wealth matters to
desperate people, as Fellows quite rightly points out on several occa-
sions.3O But then, not every A of modest means is desperate to deal
with some wealthy B, just because B has more money than A. Wealthy
B may also be awfully anxious to get A to do something, even more
anxious than A is for B's money; and in that sense, A may really have
some bargaining power with B. As long as Fellows is putting imagined
motives and events on the table, I invite everyone to see if they can
imagine the following transaction between some other turn-of-the-cen-
tury relatives:
Daddy Warbucks: Settle down and lead a nice life of leisure, and
I'll give you $1 million.
Little Orphan Annie: Get lost, ace.
Sandy: Arf!
Who's got the power? What power?
Now, that scenario is quite different from some of the other in-
stances that Fellows discusses. In some of her cases, one party is a
woman who really seems to care about somebody else - kids or
parents - while the other party is a man who reneges on an apparent
promise to help.31 There's a power differential there, all right, but the
gift doctrines Fellows discusses don't begin to capture what is going
on. Larceny is much more at issue. Take the Ervin v. Ervin32 case,
27. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
28. Fellows, supra note 3, at 336-37.
29. Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366.
30. Fellows, supra note 3, at 332-34, 343-45.
31. See id. at 332-33, 338-39 (describing the facts of Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342 (R.I.
1983) and Dewein v. Estate of Dewein, 174 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961».
32. 458 A.2d 342 (R.I. 1983). Since Fellows is interested in context, she might want to
note that Barbara Ervin represented herself, whereas her ex-husband had some lawyers. [d.
at 343.
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where the father welshed on a promise to pay for his kid's college
education. 33 I expect most people would think this was not some kind
of promised "gift" to the mom at all, but rather an independent obli-
gation to the kid. That is, it is a very ordinary notion that you are
supposed to take care of your kids if you possibly can - which, by
the way, was the way the trial court saw the matter. 34 Much the same
may be said of that brother in Dewein v. Estate of Dewein,35 who let
his sister take the whole burden of caring for their parents36 - the
parents, one might think, are his obligation too, an obligation that he
ducked. Lest the gender issue get overplayed here, though, Fellows
might have noted that one of the executors blocking -Sis's payment
from her deceased brother's estate was one Helen Dewein. 37
Fellows' view of these cases is a bit ambiguous to me, but some-
times it sounds as if she thinks that Mom and Sis really did rely on
those ultimately empty promises - that Mom and Sis would have
ditched the kids and the parents if it hadn't been for the promises of
recompense by their respective no-account men, the ex-husband and
the brother. If so, it sounds odd to me. I'd say that reliance on a
promised gift isn't what is at issue at all. I'd say that the flaw in
these cases is that they permit unjust enrichment - a version of
larceny - and the legal lapse was in not recognizing the common-sense
human obligations of those laggards to help out with the care of their
own kids and parents.
But in principle, an irresponsible mother or daughter or sister
wouldn't have had any greater obligations in these cases, at least as
a matter of law. The reason that Mom (or Sis) gets stuck is that she
takes on human obligations where the law requires nothing: if she
really does care about the kids (or the parents) and if others aren't
obliged to help out, they can take advantage of her for the very reason
that she is a more caring person than they are. That may be a partial
reason why Moms (including the Haitian maids that Fellows cites
later)38 get stuck with lousy jobs so often too: if Mom is worried about
taking care of other people, especially her children, her cares result
in what the economists call a high d·iscount rate. Having a high discount
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 174 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
36. Id. at 876.
37. Id. at 875.
38. Fellows, supra note 3, at 344-45.
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rate means that she is anxious to cut the deal, and this frequently
makes her take the short end of the stick in her various negotiations,
market and nonmarket.
I do think that Fellows is right to point out that mothers and
sisters and daughters carry around a lot of culture-bound freight in
their various dealings.39 They are the ones everybody expects to be
generous and caring and if, as I argue in my essay, exchange relations
also depend on somebody's making gifts, then Fellows has a point:
we might expect that gender inequalities persist in exchanges and
negotiations of all kinds, just because Mom and Sis and Daughter give
more, or are expected to give more.
This a subject I explored at length recently in an article entitled
(ahem) Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground. 40 Fellows
cites it a couple of times,41 but I'll bet she doesn't like that article
very much either, since she pretty much drops it like a stone. In any
event, I can't quite tell what Fellows wants to do about the problem
of gender inequalities and the way they affect bargains - but if
readers are interested in what I think about the issue, I would be
delighted if everyone would take a look at my article. Did you get
that title? That's Women and Property, etc. All right, all right, I'll
move on.
On the specific issue of native Americans:42 you bet there is a
power differential, based on war and other horrible disruptions, not-
ably the spread of European diseases. But so-called treaties made
through force, and even more clearly broken treaties, are not so hard
to analyze. Fellows doesn't think that my transfer categories explain
these matters,43 but I should think the categorization is all too simple:
they are variants of larcenies, though in the guise of deals. And as I
stated in my essay, larcenies fall precisely into the category that the
standard self-interest accounts really understand; they represent the
most unvarnished form of self-interest.44
39. See id. at 339, 343.
40. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV.
421 (1992).
41. Fellows, supra note 3, at 331 n.10, 337 n.32.
42. See id. at 345-46.
43. See id.
44. A recent article on Indian-Anglo treaties explores an interesting twist on this issue,
that is, the divergence of interests between sovereigns and their subjects in treaty ''bargains,''
and the effects on treaty rupture. See Jennifer Roback, Exchange, Sovereignty, and Indian-
Anglo Relations, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 5, 8-9, 13, 20 (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 1992).
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In fact, I think Fellows is attracted to the larceny category, since
a lot of her examples seem to be best explained that way. What I
had hoped to do in my essay was to point out that it ain't all force
and fraud and advantage-taking, and to illustrate the crucial role of
more generous impulses, in all kinds of exchange interactions. And
despite Fellows' caveats, it is unquestionably the case that huge num-
bers of these interactions - buying the newspaper, getting some
lunch, paying the bills - have almost no recognizable element of
coercion or bargaining inequalities between the parties, whatever the
larger context may be. I am acutely aware that not everyone has the
means or good fortune even to buy a paper, get lunch, or pay the
bills, and that is why I do not mind paying taxes for social programs
or making a lot of charitable donations. But that still doesn't make
all those everyday transactions coercive - or if it does, "coercion"
has grown so large as to lose all meaning as a term of distinction.
Moreover, even when a larger commercial context does present bar-
gaining inequalities, as for example in some important parts of the
world labor market, those inequalities pale by comparison to an a-
vowedly patriarchical social ordering that they may replace. 45
Fellows clearly is interested in cases where coercion matters a
great deal, even though it may not be recognized as such - and
indeed the worst kind of coercion, where the strong take from the
weak. But that sort of thing is all too easy to understand as larceny,
on the most stereotypical depictions of heedless self-interest. What is
much more difficult and fragile -- even though, I think, much more
pervasive - is what seems to be the easy case. That is the case of
reciprocal exchange, where the participants somehow manage to neu-
tralize those larcenous tendencies, for a long enough time to negotiate
their way to something that seems mutually satisfying. In my essay
I wanted to stress the generosity that underlies those seemingly easy
cases of exchange; but Fellows is right that we also need to keep an
eye out for the hidden inequalities and coerciveness that may surround
and infect such dealings. It is important to do so precisely because
coercion and bullying can undermine generosity, whereas what we
need is more generosity, not less:'6
45. See Linda Y.C. Lim, Women's Work in Export Factories: The Politics of a Cause, in
PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: WOMEN AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 101, 116-18 (Irene Tinker
ed., 1990) (pointing out the ethnocentrism and implicit patriarchialism of attacks on multinational
plants' employment of third world women).
46. This also is a point that I explore in Rose, supra note 40, at 4~7-38, 458-59.
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III. THAT MEAN OLD MARKET
Jane Baron also is not a complete believer in free transacting,
though for reasons somewhat different from the power differentials
that interest Fellows. Let me start this section with something about
categories: Fellows comments that my discussion of transfers "os-
sifies"47 the various categories, though she acknowledges that the
categories ''leak'' and even ''burst,''48 which is of course what I wanted
them to do. Beats me how leaking and bursting go together with
ossifying, but however that works, Baron's comment suggests that
maybe these categories aren't quite ossified enough. Baron, I think,
would like to preserve some space for gifts, as a separate place for
the genuine generosity she still thinks is in short supply at the corner
grocery.49
My own view is that the corner grocery isn't the source of the
problem. The problem is in other kinds of markets, especially the ones
where nobody knows anybody else. Baron makes an interesting obser-
vation: maybe gift and exchange categories melt together, she says,
because the whole schema rests on a cooked-up individualism that
does not exist in the real world - or at least, not in very many parts
of it.50 Now that's a point that resembles one that Fellows makes,
insofar as it indicates a need to focus on the social setting of transfers.
Fair enough; and in a sense, Baron's comment implies that the
eighteenth century discovery of "the market"51 is not so much a discov-
ery after all, but a kind of linguistic invention, a way of talking about
a whole group of exchange behaviors as if they were all more or less
the same thing. But one cost of talking about "the market," as one
great big thing, is that this kind of talk removes us from the ways
people really behave, and the ways they mix up elements of self-in-
terest and generosity in different kinds of exchange communities.
All this suggests that if you want to study modes of transfer, you
really have to study communities too. Of course, that is already an
implicit assumption in lots of studies of exchange behavior - not only
those anthropological studies of "gift exchange among the X tribe,"
47. Fellows, supra note 3, at 346.
48. Id. at 329, 346.
49. See Baron, supra note 6, at 362.
50. See id. at 359-61.
51. See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN
VISION OF THE 1790's 29-30 (1984).
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but also the game theory studies like Axelrod's computer games, which
place exchange behavior in those mini-communities of repeat transac-
tions and reputation.
At the far extreme, though, there are community-less markets too,
where the participants have no expected repeat play and no reliable
ways to get assurances about the goods being exchanged. That kind
of market has been studied as well, and it has been given a marvelously
descriptive name: it is the "market for lemons. "52 I think what worries
Baron is this market for lemons, and I don't mean the lemons at the
corner grocery. Economists fret that in such markets, the fear of
getting rooked makes everybody shy away, and so everyone loses
opportunities for mutually beneficial trades in, say, used cars.53 The
same lemons market, I think, makes Baron worry that we maybe
need some separate space for gifts, removed from commercial transac-
tions, because the market for lemons is a pretty mean place.54
I don't necessarily disagree with that. The difference between us
is that I think the market for lemons - although it really exists -
is not so dominating a part of commercial life as some people think it
is. Baron implicitly brings up another cost of talking about "the mar-
ket" as one great big thing: a lot of people may start to think that
the whole big thing, her big "grey area,"55 is not grey but lemon-yellow.
And so, unlike Baron, I think "the market" does need some help,
because the lemons market gives an image problem to "the market"
generally. 56 Markets have had an image problem for a long time, by
the way, as you may notice if you ever see those medieval illustrations
of avarice (the characteristic vice of commer~ial people) as apes de-
fecating moneyY In modern times, the market's image is not helped
52. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Unce'dainty and the Market
Mechnni.•m. R.J Q.J. BeoN. 48R (1970).
53. Id. at 489-90.
54. See Baron, supra note 6, at 362.
55. Id.
56. Ackerlofs own "market of lemons" analysis might suggest a kind of meta-lemon in
market transactions generally: because of lemons markets, people might be nervous about other
kinds of markets too, insofar as they are not sure of the kind of market they are dealing in.
Aside from that, some literature in cognitive psychology suggests that intuitive risk perception
weighs potential losses more heavily than potential gains ("loss aversion"), suggesting that
lemons markets might be more noticeable than fair markets. For a discussion of loss aversion,
see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 752, 776-77 (1990).
57. Lester K. Little, Pride Goes Before Avarice: Social Change and the Vices in Latin
Christendom, 76 AM. RIST. REV. 16, 37-38, 44 (1971). For the rehabilitation of "avarice" into
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by the exuberant celebration of self-interest among the greed-is-nature
crowd in economics and other fields. This is why Robert Frank's
economic work is so welcome: Frank picks up and develops the insights
of the eighteenth century economic thinkers, who argued that commer-
cial exchanges have some "moral sentiments" along with self-interest,
and that market exchanges can in a sense create a kind of community.58
Baron is skeptical whether market exchanges all by themselves
can create communities, and no doubt her point is highlighted in lemons
markets. Not much community there. So, does anything bridge the
lemons gap - that is, does anything create trust to get people over
the fear that most markets are lemons markets? This question recalls
Frank's examples, where maybe gifts and generosity do create a bridge
after all, in the sense of a culture that gives people confidence to make
the first moves. Frank talks about those highway restaurant tips;59
they could be a part of a culture of fair dealing that fosters trust in
commercial dealings generally. Maybe that is part of the reason
(though certainly not all of it) why Baron doesn't seem to want to
give up the separate category of gifts.
What I was trying to point out in my essay is that the most
ordinary transactions are animated by _a moment of gift as well, just
as, according to Robert Pirsig, the Buddha resides not just in the
green bay tree but in the motorcycle engine as well. 60 But what Baron
suggests, I think, is that it may be important to hold on to a separate
rhetoric of gift, just to remind ourselves more graphically that those
moments really are possible.
And that brings me to my next subject.
IV. JUST PLAIN STORIES
Emily Hartigan runs with some pretty fast philosophic company,
and she wants to take me along. I'm not sure this is a trek I am
ready for, being a bit slow-footed in this kind of crowd. But what
especially interests me is the way that the parts of Hartigan's essay,
taken together, tie back in with all of the other comments. Like Frank,
Hartigan is interested in gift-giving behavior that from some perspec-
the more benign "interest" in the eighteenth century, see ALBERT o. HIRSCHMAN, THE PAS-
SIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH
54-60 (1977).
58. FRANK, supra note 17, at 43-56; see HIRSCHMAN, supra note 57, at 59-61.
59. Frank, supra note 1, at 326.
60. ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 76 (1974).
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tives is "irrational,"61 though Hartigan is more interested than Frank
in the religious ramifications of this behavior. 62 Like Fellows, she is
interested in the role of women in giving, though she is less pessimistic
than Fellows about that role. 63 Like Baron, Hartigan thinks that there
is a relation between gift-giving and rhetoric or narrative, and she
dwells on this subject on a number of levels. 64
It is the last point that I want to pick up here, at least briefly.
What is this connection between narratives and gifts? One answer
that Hartigan gives is that stories - or at least symbols - simply
are gifts, that is, as she says, gifts of thought. 65 Another possibility
is one that I tried to explore earlier, in an article that Hartigan cites. 66
Briefly, the argument there is that gifts and generous behavior gen-
erally are a logical puzzle, and they require stories to explain them.
The reason they are puzzling is that larcenous and self-interested
defectors can bash the generous types in the usual Prisoners' Dilemma
games, and this means that generosity or gift-giving has to be
explained. For that reason, generous behavior demands a story -
some kind of narrative.
Be that as it may, gift-giving certainly is the subject for many
stories, perhaps most notably the creation myths that Hartigan men-
tions. 67 There are lots of creation stories about law-givers, too -
Solon, the Founders and so on. And even a story central to Western
metaphysics begins with a kind of overflowing "principle of plenitude"
at the top of that "great chain of being" that A.O. Lovejoy immor-
talized in his book of the same name. 68
If gifts call forth stories, they may in a certain sense provide the
occasion for the creation, transmission and transformation of com-
munities, since these are among the functions that narratives serve. 69
Not that gifts are imperial in this regard, though. While I don't know
a great deal about this matter, it does seem to me that larcenies also
give the occasion for lots of stories, particularly when larcenies are
61. Hartigan, supra note 5, at 350.
62. See id. at 351-53.
63. See id. at 352-53.
64. See id. at 347-48, 350-53.
65. [d. at 351.
66. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theonj, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J. LAW & HUMAN. 37 (1990).
67. Hartigan, supra note 5. at 352-53.
68. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF
AN IDEA 48-52 (1936).
69. See DAVID CARR, TIME, NARRATIVE AND HISTORY 148-50, 156-57 (1986).
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perpetrated by the weak on the strong. Prometheus and Robin Hood
are the subjects of some pretty good yarns, though I suppose it is
worth noting that both those stories also involve gifts tacked on after
the larcenies (of fire to humans, of property to the poor).
Hartigan makes a subtler point about gifts and narrative, and this
comes in her gentle chiding of my rather countrified style. In particu-
lar, she describes my own message as a kind of gift;70 what I think
she is saying is that I am trying to conceal a gift with all that plain
folksiness. I am extremely embarrassed at this overly flattering depic-
tion. In any event, I think Hartigan does not realize that some of us
really do have a countrified way of thinking, and, for example, would
be ecstatic if we could come up with lyrics like the ones that Patty
Loveless recently sang: "Can't get no satisfaction/and my tractor don't
get no traction."71
Putting my own embarrassment to one side, I am interested in
the larger idea that Hartigan is putting forth here: that different types
of transfers are likely to elicit different narrative styles. Once Hartigan
alludes to this point, of course, it seems that it should have been
stunningly obvious all along. Gift stories are most likely to have a
certain mythic quality. Larceny stories (when told at all) are all clev-
erness and bravado on the part of the taker, and all blues, injustice,
and resentment on the part of the taken-from.
Hartigan thinks my story is a gift, yet it is styled as plain-folksy
instead of mythic. Why is that? Well, I actually didn't think about it,
but now that I have read Hartigan, I think maybe my semi-conscious
folksiness was an effort to do a little chiding myself, of the typical
exchange narratives. Those narratives are all just-plainness. "I want
this, you want that, so is it a deal? Yup." That's the plain-folks rhetoric
of exchange.
This is a prosaic kind of rhetoric, one that too easily pretends that
everything just happens naturally and that the parties' self-interest
is the whole story. But the just-plain, unsentimental rhetoric of ex-
change conceals something about how exchanges really work - their
reliance on goodwill, and their potential to get the actors to think
from other people's points of view. Those are elements of a culture
of exchange that the eighteenth century economists hoped for; and
when one looks to the heroic efforts that must now be taken to teach
70. Hartigan, supra note 5, at 348.
71. PA'ITY LOVELESS, On Down the Line, on ON DOWN THE LINE (MeA, 1990).
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simple pleasantries to business trainees in the former Soviet Union, 72
one might think that perhaps there really is such a thing as a culture
of commercial civility, a culture that we have been merely taking for
granted under the just-plain rhetoric of our own deal-making.
Several of the commentators here have reminded me that market
exchanges can be a pretty bad business. All right, all right: no one
but a fool would think· that exchanges are all a matter of Pollyanna
trading sweetly with Rebecca of Sunnybrook Farm. But we are fooling
ourselves too if we pretend that exchanges are all a matter of Simon
Legree one-upping Scrooge McDuck. Hartigan is right that rhetoric
matters, and by opening the door on the gift elements in exchanges,
what I hoped to do was to open up the just-plain rhetoric of exchange,
so that it might be a little less truculent about acknowledging some
of its own dependence on humaneness. I keep saying this, but I'll say
it again: humaneness is what we need more of, even in exchanges.
That is one reason why humaneness is interesting, and why we need
to be able to talk about it unabashedly.
72. See Adi Ignatius, Russians Who Wear Jungle Ties or Spit Need Not Apply, WALL ST.
J., June 9, 1992, at 1, col. 4.
